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THE CITIZEN LAWYER-A BRIEF INFORMAL HISTORY OF
A MYTH WITH SOME BASIS IN REALITY
ROBERT W. GORDON*
The term "citizen lawyer" seems to be shorthand for a complex
assortment of social types, but the core meaning is plain enough.
The citizen lawyer is a lawyer who acts in a significant part of his
or her professional life with some plausible vision of the public good
and the general welfare in mind. Of course, citizen lawyers, like
most lawyers, may seek wealth, power, fame, and reputation for
themselves. They may also represent and further the ends of clients
with distinctly selfish or antisocial interests. What makes them
citizen lawyers, then, is that they also devote time and effort to
public ends and values: the service of the Republic, their communities, the ideal of the rule of law, and reforms to enhance the law's
efficiency, fairness, and accessibility.'
So general and bland a definition would, I expect, command
agreement from most lawyers. But it covers up deep divisions
among the views that lawyers have traditionally held on the proper
scope of their public or civic obligations.
American lawyers' starting point for conventional reasoning
about these roles, more or less a constant throughout its history, is
like that of professions of advocates elsewhere: that lawyers
effectively produce the public goods of justice and the rule of law by
just doing their regular day jobs, zealously serving their clients.2

* Chancellor Kent Professor of Law and Legal History, Yale University.
1. See W. Taylor Reveley III, The Citizen Lawyer, 50 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1309 (2009)
(discussing of a variety of ways lawyers can participate in their communities).
2. See MONROE FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETHIcs IN AN ADvERsARY SYSTEM 10-12, 43-49
(1973) (using examples to defend a theory of zealous advocacy).

1169

1170

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50:1169

The paradigmatic public benefit of private practice is illustrated by
criminal defense, the defense of individual clients' rights of liberty
and property against the dangers of an overbearing state.3 In civil
litigation as well, by vigorously asserting some clients' claims and
defending others against such claims, the lawyer plays a vital,
differentiated part in a process, the adversary system, whose overall
end is the vindication of rights and the defeat of unjust claims.4 In
the words of the official comments to the ABA's current ethics code,
"[Cilients come to lawyers in order to determine their rights and
what is, in the complex of laws and regulations, deemed to be legal
and correct. Based upon experience, lawyers know that almost all
clients follow the advice given, and the law is upheld."5 Like the
invisible hand of the market, which aggregates selfish interests into
a virtuous equilibrium, the procedures of the legal system bring
clients' private interests into harmony with public goals and values.6
But only the most starry-eyed idealist could take seriously this
account of a perfect convergence between private practice and public
benefits. Legal systems are subject to systemic failure even more
than markets. Legal resources-access to and ability to pay legal
talent (lawyers)-are distributed very unequally, so that instead of
delivering equal justice, they are put largely to the service of wealth
The American legal system is adversarial, with each party to a lawsuit, either
personally or through an attorney, investigating his case and presenting facts
to an impartial tribunal while simultaneously seeking to rebut the evidence
offered by the opposition. The entire American historical experience is
punctuated by instances of struggles for individual rights, and against this
background it is not surprising that the American legal system has developed
as an adversarial one.
Id.
3. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. VI; see also FREEDMAN, supra note 2, at 8; Sanford
Levinson, What Should Citizens (asParticipantsin a Republican Form of Government) Know
About the Constitution, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1239, 1240 (2009) (highlighting that the
tension between common good and individual representation is muted in representation of
criminal clients).
4. See FREEDMAN, supra note 2, at 8; Levinson, supra note 3, at 1240 (discussing the
effects of zealous representation in civil cases); cf. Edward Rubin, The Citizen Lawyer and the
Administrative State, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1335, 1343 (2009) (noting instances in which
the differences between criminal prosecutions and civil suits were blurred).
5. MODEL RULEs OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmts. 1 & 3 (2007).
6. See Mark Tushnet, Citizen as Lawyer, Lawyer as Citizen, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1379, 1384-85 (2009) (arguing that the law is created as a result of the aggregation of
individual interests and values that ultimately reflect the public good).
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and tend to magnify inequalities of power.' Law can be an instrument of extortion and oppression.8 Lawyers can and do help
plaintiffs to pursue frivolous and unjust claims to extort settlements,9 and they help defendants resist valid and just claims
through delay and discovery abuse. 10 Lawyers can and do lobby for
bad laws and rulings that promote special interests over any
plausible view of the general welfare, and by means of procedural
tactics or strained interpretations effectively resist and even nullify
good laws."
Yet lawyers are also the principal instrumentalities for producing the public goods sought from the effective operation of the
legal system-the protection of individual rights, equal justice between persons, security and public order, and the implementation
of policies designed to promote the common welfare. 2 The law is the
originating cause, the raison d'etre, of the lawyer's calling, the
reason for licensing this special corps of social agents. If the
activities of lawyers undermine the public benefits of law, should
not lawyers themselves have special obligations-deriving from
their situation and opportunities, their expert knowledge, and their
7. DEBORAH RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE 2 (2000). In this symposium, Rhode
discusses a lack of access to justice as a result of the disjuncture between the bar's exalted pro
bono principles and lawyers' actual pro bono practice. See generally Deborah Rhode, Lawyers
as Citizens, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1323 (2009).
8. RHODE, supra note 7, at 2.
9. See Austin Sarat, Ethics in Litigation: Rhetoric of Crisis, Realities of Practice, in
ETHics IN PRACTICE: LAWYERS' ROLES, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND REGULATION 145, 157 (Deborah
L. Rhode ed., 2003) (describing a "blame the other guy" approach to litigation, through which
a lawyer claims that the opposing counsel is bringing a frivolous case, uses the discovery
process to figure out whether he has a case, and even seeks to extort payments for ceasing to
be a "nuisance").
10. See, e.g., SOL M. LINOWITZ, THE BETRAYED PROFESSION 14 (1994) (describing the
tactics R.J. Reynolds Company's lawyers used in the 1980s to try to force plaintiffs to drop
their tobacco-related cases).
11. For a concise review and critique of the adversary-advocacy system, see generally
RHODE, supra note 7, at 49-80. The classic critique of the ideology of adversary-advocacy
remains William H. Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy: ProceduralJustice and Professional
Ethics, 1978 WIS. L. REV. 29; see also Michael Rosenfeld, Deconstruction and Legal
Interpretation:Conflict, Indeterminacy and the Temptations of the New Legal Formalism, 11
CARDOZO L. REV. 1211 (1990) (recognizing the belief that all the dispositions of legal issues
are ultimately political and subjective).
12. In the Untied States, lawyers have created a government structure "that is a model
for much of the world. And they have been leaders in virtually all movements for social justice
in the nation's history." RHODE, supra note 7, at 3.
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monopoly of the privilege to practice-to help impove the law and its
day-to-day administration? These are the obligations of the lawyer
as citizen.
In our legal culture, the big arguments within the profession
have been over whether performance of the citizen lawyer's role is
distinct from, or an integral part of, the regular lawyer's job. To
summarize the major arguments:
(1) One view is that public lawyering is strictly the task of
separate and distinct corps of public lawyers-judges, government lawyers, and public interest lawyers-and that ordinary
private lawyers can safely leave to such officials and NGOs the
job of repairing and improving the framework of laws.13
(2) A second view is that all members of the profession,
including private practitioners, have obligations to perform
public functions.14 Some lawyers think that (a) these public
tasks or duties are to be performed in venues separate from
regular practice, on leave from practice, or in after-hours pro
bono practice or bar activity or reform politics. 5 Others
maintain, however, that (b) at least some of the profession's
public obligations should be incorporated into the regular
6
functions of private practice.
So basically, the first view says, "Ifthe law as implemented through
our advice and efforts happens to result in major injustices, that's
someone else's problem to fix." The second view says, either (a) 'It's
a special responsibility of our profession, but one we should work to
discharge in settings outside our day jobs"; or (b) "Some public
obligations come along with the day job."

13. See id. at 2 ('Many lawyers are, in Auden's apt phrase, 'trudging in tune to a tidy
fortune,' but they have lost their connection to the values of social justice that sent them to
law in the first place.").
14. LAWYERS' ETHICS AND THE PURSUIT OF SOCIAL JUSTICE: A CRITICAL READER 47 (Susan
D. Carle, ed. 2005) (portraying the civic republican lawyer as one who sees his primary duties
as serving community leaders and safeguarding the public interest, rather than solely
advocating for his client).
15. See Reed Elizabeth Loder, Tending the Generous Heart: Mandatory Pro Bono and
Moral Development, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 459, 460 (2001).
16. The classic expression of the idea that lawyers must reform the law in the regular
course of practicing it is LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, BUSINESS: A PROFESSION 313-27 (1914).
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This second view in both its variants expresses the ideal of the
citizen lawyer-sometimes also called the "civic-republican" or
"public interest" conception of law practice.1 7 For reasons I will try
to explain, this ideal has lately fallen out of favor with the modern
profession, or at least with its elite practitioners. Most support
for the citizen lawyer ideal comes, if anywhere, from government
lawyers, public interest lawyers, academic lawyers, judges, bar
leaders, and retired lawyers, often accompanied by laments at its
disappearance or marginality in the rhetoric and practice of the bar.
Let me take a moment .to spell out some of the implications of the
citizen lawyer ideal for the day-to-day conduct of legal practice.
In advising clients contemplating litigation, the citizen lawyer
takes into account the merits or justice of the claim. She seeks to
dissuade plaintiffs from pursuing plainly meritless claims, and
encourages defendants towards fair settlements and away from
invalid defenses of just claims. The purely private-minded lawyer,
by contrast, asks only whether-justly or not-a client is likely to
obtain, or forestall, a settlement or outcome worth the costs of suit;
his aim is simply to maximize his client's damages or minimize his
client's liability.
When involved in litigation, the citizen lawyer regards herself
as an "officer of the court," that is, a trustee for the integrity and
fair operation of the basic procedures of the adversary system, the
rules of the game, and their underlying purposes."8 She fights
aggressively for her client, but in ways respectful of the fair and
effective operation of this framework. 9 In discovery, she frames
requests intended to elicit useful information rather than to harass
and inflict costs, and responds to reasonable requests rather than
obstructing or delaying. She claims privilege or work product
protection only when she thinks a fair-minded judge would be likely
to independently support the claim. In deciding how ferociously to
attack the credibility of a witness on cross-examination, she tries to
assess and take into account the likely truthfulness of the witness
and the underlying merits of the case. The intensely private-minded
17.
18.
loyalty
19.

See Symposium, The Republican Civic Tradition,97 YALE L.J. 1493 (1988).
See LINOWITz, supra note 10, at 9 (describing an "Officer of the Court" as one who owes
to one's client, but first owes "deference to the court and obedience to the law").
See id.

1174

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50:1169

lawyer, by contrast, only seeks to win for his client, regardless of
collateral damage to adversaries, third parties, and the effective
operation of the judicial framework; he exploits every possible
weakness of negligent, incompetent, or underfunded adversaries
and inattentive judges or magistrates; he stretches the rules to the
utmost allowable extent. °
In advising clients outside litigation, the citizen lawyer is the
"wise counselor," who sees her job as guiding the client to comply
with the underlying spirit or purpose as well as the letter of laws
and regulations to desist from unlawful conduct,2 1 and if needed, to
do so with strong advice backed by the threat of withdrawal, and in
extreme cases, of disclosure.2 2 If the client needs her help to resist
or change unfavorable law, she makes the challenge public and
transparent, to facilitate its authoritative resolution. Her privateminded counterpart is of course the hired gun, whose sole concern
is with minimizing adverse effects of law on his client's plans and
profits. 23 The neutral version of the lawyer-agent simply identifies
legal constraints and advises clients on risks of detection and
20. For a discussion of the distinction between vigorous representation and being an
"officer of the court," see Simon, supra note 11, at 37, noting that some ethics scholars take
partisanship for granted and
would probably agree that the lawyer should not reveal adverse evidence
learned from the client even though it may be relevant and probative. They
would probably agree that he should exclude accurate, probative adverse
evidence at trial whenever the rules of evidence permit. They would agree that
he should not hesitate to plead his client not guilty even when he knows the
client has committed the crime with which he is charged, and they would
probably agree that he should invoke the statues of frauds and limitations to
defeat otherwise valid civil claims.... Others have thought that partisanship
warrants the use of dilatory procedural tactics, lying under almost any
circumstances in which discovery is unlikely, and the citation of false precedents
to the judge.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
21. See LINOWI'Z, supra note 10, at 12 ("As the clergyman advises on the moral nexus of
his parishioners' problems, the lawyer tells clients what the law permits them to do.").
22. See id. at 4 ("Elihu Root put the matter more simply: 'About half the practice of a
decent lawyer,' he once said, 'consists of telling would-be clients that they are damned fools
and should stop.").
23. See Lawrence M. Friedman, Some Thoughts About Citizen Lawyers, 50 WM. & MARY
L. REv. 1153, 1161 (2009) (remarking that, while "troublemaker[ ]" lawyers do exist, far more
lawyers simply wish to help their clients in "minimizing transaction costs, circumventing
regulatory constraints, escaping encumbering liabilities, and pursuing various strategic
objectives').
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costs of noncompliance.24 The aggressive or hardball lawyer-agent
enthusiastically undertakes to bend; stretch; punch loopholes
in; and nullify by obstruction, concealment, and delay the legal
and regulatory constraints in the path of a client's desires and
interests.25
Citizen lawyers acknowledge that the system of adversary representation that creates and justifies their roles as zealous
advocates cannot pretend to function fairly unless everyone who
needs a lawyer (or an equivalent means of access to the legal
system) can get one.2 6 In this view, legal services are themselves
public goods and the legal profession is a public utility charged with
supplying these services to poor and unpopular clients-through
mandatory pro bono services or support of legal services programs."
Private-minded lawyers reject this conception of the profession's
obligations.2 In their view, any client who can find a lawyer willing
to represent him and can pay for that lawyer's services is entitled
to one.29 If some people cannot afford lawyers, that is not peculiarly
the legal profession's responsibility to fix: legislatures may (or may
not) choose to subsidize them out of general tax revenues through
public defender or legal services programs, vouchers for judicare, or
fee-award systems.3 0

24. See Robert W. Gordon, A New Role for Lawyers?: The CorporateCounselorAfter Enron,
35 CONN. L. REV. 1185, 1191 (2003) (describing the lawyer's role as a risk manager).
25. RHODE, supra note 7, at 7 (discussing "lawyer's willingness to manipulate the systems
on behalf of clients without regard to right or wrong").
26. See RIcHARD ZITRIN & CAROL M. LANGFORD, THE MORAL COMPASS OF THE AMERICAN

LAWYER 233-34 (1999) (discussing the structure of the American legal system and its
implications for those who might lack access in other systems).
27. See Rhode, supra note 7, at 1332 (advocating for mandatory pro bono reporting
requirements enforced by courts, bar associations, or legal employers). But see James E.
Moliterno, A Golden Age of Civic Involvement: The Client CenteredDisadvantagefor Lawyers
Acting as Public Officials, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1261, 1273 (2009) ('IThe organized bar has
never embraced an ethic of more-than-optional public service for lawyers.").
28. Even though many private-minded lawyers do provide free legal services, "both
individuals and professional organizations typically recoil at the idea of mandated service."
Loder, supra note 15, at 460.
29. For a glimpse on how the public at large feels about this view as it manifests itself in
reality, see RHODE, supra note 7, at 7 ("Americans dislike the fact that the best legal
representation typically goes to the highest bidder and that law is accessible only to those who
can afford it. But Americans also dislike efforts to remedy those inequalities.... Our nation
spends far less than other Western industrial societies on subsidized legal representation.").
30. See Steven Wechsler, Attorney's Attitudes Toward MandatoryProBono, 41 SYRACUSE

1176

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50:1169

To generalize more broadly about these types, the citizen lawyer
identifies broadly with the institutions, goals, and procedures of the
legal system, even though she may (and if she is conscientious,
probably does) also think that aspects of the existing system are
inefficient, oppressive, or fundamentally unjust.3 She feels a sense
of proprietorship, or ownership in common, of the legal framework
-that the law, considered aspirationally as well as conservatively,
as a set of norms and principles rather than a collection of particular rules, is in her profession's special stewardship, to preserve and
cultivate and reform so it can serve its best purposes." In some
instances, it may be that unjust laws or bad interpretations of them
are so entrenched in conventional legal practice that a lawyer could
not deprive a client of the unjust advantages they confer without
committing malpractice. In that case, the citizen lawyer works with
law reform commissions, bar committees and task forces, legislative
committees, and administrative agencies to reform laws to make
them more just and efficient, regardless of whether the reforms
would help or hurt their clienteles.33 The private-minded lawyer (or
at least his pure type), on the other hand, views the law and its
procedures from the outside, as an alienated observer and instrumental manipulator: he is Holmes's "bad man;" to him, the law is
only an instrument-a bundle of opportunities for, or obstacles in
the way of, realizing his clients' ends. 4 If the law-as-it-is serves his
client of the moment, he will support it; if not, he will undermine it.
L. REv. 909, 914-30 (discussing taxpayer-subsidized and other mandatory pro bono initiatives
from a historical perspective).
31. For a description of how such a lawyer might respond to laws she perceives as unjust,
see ANTHONY KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER 18-19 (1993) ("[A good lawyer] must also be a
public-spirited reformer who monitors this framework itself and leads others in campaigning
for those repairs that are required to keep it responsive and fair.... mhe appropriate object
of the law reformer's concerns is the structural arrangement of the legal order as a whole and
not the resolution of particular disputes of the sort that lawsuits and other concrete
controversies typically involve.").
32. See id.
33. See Robert W. Gordon, CorporateLaw Practiceas a PublicCalling,49 MD. L. REV. 255,
286 (1990) (describing the ways law reform groups, bar associations, and task forces allow
lawyers to articulate disinterested views of policy).
34. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 459 (1897)
(describing the "bad man" as one "who cares only for the material consequences" that
knowledge and manipulation of the law may bring about, and does not defer to morality or
other decisions greater than these consequences).
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Keep in mind that these are models or ideal types, and that any
real-life lawyer is likely to blend these models. Few people who seek
the social respect attached to professional status enjoy being
typecast as cynical villains, eager to do dirty work for anyone willing
to pay for it. It is hard for a lawyer to sustain the feeling that he is
pursuing an honorable vocation purely as a zealous agent for
clients and causes that he despises: he has to rationalize his practice
as serving some larger social end.35 Lawyers in this situation often
invoke the standard view of adversary advocacy as ultimately
resulting in a virtuous equilibrium. For example, criminal defense
lawyers, besides feeling sorry for many of their clients, and believing
that their clients are in more trouble than they deserve, reasonably
suppose that aggressive defense performs an indispensable public
function in checking police and prosecutorial abuse and bargaining
down savage sentences to something approaching proportional
punishment.3 6 Even some of the most ferocious hardball players
may have a passion for legal ideals as well as devotion to client
interests-for example, business lawyers inflamed by strong libertarian convictions that the high-tax regulatory welfare state violates
basic rights of liberty and property and cripples wealth-producing
enterprise; 37 or for that matter, lawyers resisting federal racial
integration orders in the belief that these infringe on states'
sovereign rights, increase racial tensions and violence, or are futile
and counterproductive because they will only cause white flight
without achieving any actual integration. 38 But a lawyer who
35. See, e.g., RHODE, supra note 7, at 49 (reflecting on working at the Washington, D.C.
public defender's office:
My supervisor was able to get the case [a brutal murder committed by two
juvenile offenders] dismissed on what the public would consider a "technicality."
He also was proud of his accomplishment.... [W]ith the benefit of a quarter
century's hindsight, I think both my supervisor and I were right. He was
providing an essential and ethically defensible safeguard for constitutional
values. And I was right to feel morally troubled by the consequences.
36. See id. at 55.
37. See Sung Hui Kim, The Banality of Fraud: Resituating the Inside Counsel as
Gatekeeper, 74 FoRDHAM L. REv. 983, 1013 (2005).
38. See Edward J. Kelly III, Note, White Flight as a Factorin DesegregationRemedies: A
Judicial Recognition of Reality, 66 VA. L. REv. 961, 961-62 (1980); James Dao, The New
Administration: The Justice Department;Ashcroft Leaned Right, Then Center, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 23, 2001, at A15 (discussing John Ashcroft's efforts as state Attorney General and later
Governor to overturn federal rulings finding Missouri schools liable for segregation).
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improvises a novel high-minded rationale for representing every
new profitable client cannot qualify as a citizen lawyer in my
conception of the role. That conception requires that the lawyer
commit some part of himself or herself to a view of the legal
framework and its norms that may sometimes cut against the shortterm interests of the client at hand, who may simply want an ad hoc
exemption from laws that generally benefit everyone, including (and
often, especially) himself.
This Article will evaluate the history and current status of this
conception. Is the ideal of the "citizen lawyer," as I've broadly
defined it, in decline? Prominent spokespersons for the American
legal profession have said that it is, and have done so almost from
the very beginning of the Republic.3 9 The laments that law has
decayed from a profession to a business, that lawyer-statesmen have
given way to profit maximizers, and that lawyers have sold out the
honor of their profession and its devotion to the public good for selfseeking, are perennial themes in our professional culture, sounded
anew in every generation.4" It is tempting to think that laments so
common and so constant must be mere nostalgic diatribes, the
sentiments of yearning for better41 and simpler times that overcome
every generation on its way out.
These laments are certainly overgeneralized. Lawyers complaining about decline often compare the ordinary lawyers of today with
the extraordinary ones of the past.4 2 They compare lawyers in
normal times to lawyers called upon to respond to exceptional
challenges demanding extraordinary public efforts-for example,
the Revolution and Constitutional Convention, the slavery crisis
39. See RHODE, supra note 7, at 1 (reporting that between the beginning of the nineteenth
century and the present the legal profession has continuously lamented its loss of honor).
40. For some of the most prominent and eloquent of such laments, see generally MARY
ANN GLENDON, A NATION UNDER LAWYERS (1994); KRONMAN, supra note 31; LINOWITZ, supra
note 10; ZITRIN & LANGFORD, supra note 26, at 45.
41. See Marc Galanter, Lawyers in the Mist: The GoldenAge of Legal Nostalgia, 100 DICK.
L. REv. 549-62 (1996).
42. See, e.g., KRONMAN, supra note 31, at 11 (describing a speech that Chief Justice
William Rehnquist gave to students at the University of Chicago Law School that proceeds
by extolling the careers of eight notable legal figures, all from the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries, and concluding by commenting briefly on the demise of the lawyer-statesman as
an important professional type); LINOWITZ, supra note 10, at 9 (calling prominent lawyers of
the past, such as John Adams and John Marshall, "icons" and "leaders of their communities
and of the country").
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and Civil War, and the Great Depression and World War II-which
mobilized platoons of lawyers to rally to the cause.43 It is not
surprising that no group of lawyers has approached the distinction
of the Founders: none have had the opportunity, arguably, to play
such heroic roles. Nor is it surprising that lawyers on leave from
practice no longer dominate the major posts of government as
they did when governments were small and law was the only
training for public affairs." Lawyers still dominate the staffing of
senior political posts, but many of them have been replaced by
professional politicians in the legislatures, and, in the wake of the
expansion of bureaucratic government, by full-time civil servants in
appointive positions who may possess expertise in rival professions
such as economics, journalism, public policy, or foreign affairs.
Contrary to the rhetoric of decline, the general ethical standards
of practice, one practical measure of civic virtue, are probably higher
today than they have been for most of our history simply because
bar associations, courts, regulators, and law firms have put in place
some disciplinary machinery to enforce them.4 5 More importantly,
there are more lawyers who work full-time in the "public interest"-as government lawyers, legal services lawyers, lawyers for
nongovernmental organizations serving causes (civil rights and civil
liberties, human rights, the environment, etc.)-and part-time as
"pro bono" counsel, as well as academic lawyers, than there have
ever been.4 6 Their numbers are very small as a proportion of the
43. See LINOWITZ, supra note 10, at 9.
44. See Robert W. Gordon, The American Legal Profession, 1870-2000, in 3 THE
CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF LAW IN AMERICA 73, 96 (Michael Grossberg & Christopher Tomlins
eds., 2008) (describing the Eastern corporate lawyers who "dominated high foreign policy
posts in the first half of the twentieth century"); see also Reveley, supra note 1, at 1313
(arguing that when the number of lawyers in the legislature declines, "the caliber of the laws
made often declines too").
45. See Jeanne F. Backof & Charles L. Martin, Jr., HistoricalPerspectives:Development
of the Codes of Ethics in the Legal, Medical andAccounting Professions, 10 J. Bus. ETHICS 99,
104 (1991) (asserting that such changes were the product of "changes in public attitudes and
values, governmental influence, and changes within the bar itself").
46. The total number of lawyers in the United States increased from 109,000 in 1900 to
nearly 1,000,000 in 1999. Robert W. Gordon, The LegalProfession, in LOOKING BACK AT LAW'S
CENTURY 287, 292 (Austin Sarat, Bryant Garth & Robert A. Kagan eds., 2002). More
specifically, the number of lawyers employed in government, legal aid, and public defender
positions rose from 77,889 in 1980 to 101,790 in 2000. But note that the percentage of lawyers
employed in these positions as compared to the total lawyer population actually declined from
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bar-the total quantities of legal aid and pro bono practice are
derisory in relation to the demand 47 -but most of the jobs they do
scarcely existed a hundred years ago, when even felony defendants
routinely went unrepresented or depended on the random luck of
appointed counsel. Since the 1970s, bar associations, which used to
be hostile or indifferent to legal aid and public interest law, have
become enthusiastic backers of increased access to the legal system
as well as of general legalist causes, such as improving the quality
of the judiciary and promoting the rule of law abroad.48
By many indications, therefore, at least some versions of the
citizen lawyer ideal are very much alive, and even if not exactly
flourishing everywhere, they are at least more vigorous than they
ever used to be. Nonetheless, I think the rhetoric of decline captures
something real. To some extent, the performance of public roles has
devolved onto specialists in the public good, like government and
"cause" lawyers." It is the ideal of the citizen lawyer as part of the
calling of ordinary private lawyer that is in recession. That has
happened because the economic, political, and cultural conditions
that helped to sustain the ideal no longer remain. The history of
this development is very long and complex.5 ° I provide here only
a summary sketch with a sprinkling of examples. I begin by noting
a striking contradiction. In comparison to other societies, the
American legal profession is overwhelmingly oriented to service of
private clients. In many other societies the top graduates of elite
schools go into the state civil service; in the United States they
mostly go to large private law firms.5 American legal ethics tend to
16 percent to 11 percent in the same time period. CLARA N. CARSON, THE LAWYER STATISTICAL
REPORT: THE U.S. LEGAL PROFESSION IN 2000, at 6 (2004).
47. See Gordon, supra note 46, at 292-93; see also Manny Fernandez, Free Legal Aid
Sought for Elderly Tenants, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 2007, at B3 ("Legal Services for New York
City, which represents and advises about 10,000 households, said the agency assisted only 21
percent of eligible tenants who seek their help.").
48. See EARL JOHNSON, JR., JUSTICE AND REFORM: THE FORMATIVE YEARS OF THE
AMERICAN LEGAL SERVICES PROGRAM 254-59 (1978).

49. See generally CAUSE LAWYERING: POLITICAL COMMITMENTS AND PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITIES (Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold eds., 1998) [hereinafter CAUSE
LAWYERING] (containing articles that discuss the context, organization, strategies, and
potential of "cause" lawyering).
50. For this Article, I draw on a larger work-in-progress on the history of law as a public
profession.
51. See NALP FOUND. FOR LAW CAREER RESEARCH & EDUC., AFTER THE JD: FIRSTRESULTS
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stress the ideal of adversary advocacy-loyalty and zeal in service
of client interests--over service of public ends. Our ethics codes
firmly cement lawyers' loyalty to clients, and we expect lawyers to
creatively stretch the law, facts, and procedural maneuvers to
benefit clients, even at some cost to the effective functioning of the
legal framework as a whole.52
But at the same time, American lawyers have an exceptionally
robust tradition of public service and public involvement. The
American public leadership class has been overwhelmingly drawn
from the legal profession: lawyers generally constitute over half of
the state and federal legislatures, the majority of senior appointive
posts in the executive branch agencies, and of course virtually all
judges.5" And the public contributions of American lawyers go well
beyond service in public office. Lawyers from private practice have
served as key figures in policy entrepreneurship and movements to
provide legal, civic, and social reform.' They have invented the
occupations of "cause" lawyer and "public interest" lawyer and have
exported them to the rest of the world.5 5
Lawyers do not play these central public roles in every society.
We owe their prominence in our public life to a distinctive political
history. Before the American Revolution, the bar was divided between those lawyers who held office in the British imperial administration and those who represented planters, landowners, merchants,
and other citizens who often came into conflict with the Crown.5
The lawyers who represented colonial interests became the main
spokesmen for colonial grievances in the struggles with England.5 7
After the Revolution, the lawyers and officials loyal to Britain
emigrated.5" Those left behind were inclined to distrust executive
OF A NATIONAL STUDY OF LEGAL CAREERS 25-26 (2004); Gordon, supra note 46, at 331 n.1.
52. See Robert W. Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. REV. 1, 20 (1988).
53. MARK C. MILLER, THE HIGH PRIESTS OF AMERICAN POLITICS: THE ROLE OF LAWYERS IN
AMERICAN POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS 31-43, 50-52, 61-64 (1995).
54. See Gordon, supra note 46, at 318-27.
55. See id. at 326.
56. See Alfred S. Konefsky, The Legal Profession: From the Revolution to the Civil War,
in 2 THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORYOFLAWINAMERICA 68, 71-73 (Michael Grossberg & Christopher
Tomlins eds., 2007).
57. See Richard B. Morris, The Legal Profession in America on the Eve of the Revolution,
in POLITICAL SEPARATION & LEGAL CONTINUITY 3, 23-27 (Harry W. Jones ed., 1976).
58. See 2 ANTON-HERMANN CHROUST, THE RISE OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION IN AMERICA 5-
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authority, bureaucratic centralization, and aristocratic dominance.5 9
The Revolution permanently put the major models of European
governance off the table.6" One was rule by hereditary classes of
monarchs and landed nobles.6 ' The other was what would gradually
develop in England and the European continent over the nineteenth
century: governance through an elite group of powerful and highly
educated civil servants.62
The Revolutionary generation thought America's destiny was
governance by a light hand-popular government by elected amateurs serving brief terms, and by other popular institutions such as
juries."3 In America, the ambitious would seek business success
rather than a place at court. Most Americans, they assumed, would
not have to think about government at all--only about making a
living, getting ahead, and taming a continent.6 4 The main job of law
would be protecting the People's rights from the danger of an
overbearing State.65
As it turned out, the main problems facing the new states and
nation were not caused by overbearing government, but too little
and ineffective government, not an excess of law but a shortage of
law.6 6 Alexis de Tocqueville observed that a commercial-democratic
society could suffer badly for want of political leadership, because
although in theory the people ruled, most were uninterested in the
public's business and did not elect superior men to public office.6 7
10 (1965); LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 226 (3d ed. 2005).
59. See CHROUST, supra note 58, at 5-7.
60. See MAX M. EDLING, A REVOLUTION IN FAVOR OF GOVERNMENT 46 (2003).
61. See id. at 52.
62. See Konefsky, supra note 56, at 73-74 (noting that by virtue of their education and
training, lawyers were particularly well suited to replace the ministry as society's preferred
leaders).
63. See JR. Pole, Reflections on American Law and the American Revolution, 50 WM. &
MARY Q. 123, 145 (1993).
64. See Mark R. Wilson, Law and the American State, From the Revolution to the Civil
War: InstitutionalGrowth and Structural Change, in 2 THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF LAW IN
AMERICA 1, 3 (Michael Grossberg & Christopher Tomlins eds., 2007).
65. See CHROUST, supra note 58, at 32.
66. See EDLING, supra note 60, at 45-46.
67. See, e.g., ALExIS DE TOCQUEViLLE, 1 DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (Henry Reeve trans.,
Arlington House Press 1966) (1835) ("The pursuit of wealth generally diverts men of great
talents and of great passions from the pursuit of power: and it very frequently happens that
a man does not undertake to direct the fortune of the State until he has discovered his
incompetence to conduct his own affairs.").
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Yet the new states, the new nation, and the new economy required
more regular and sustained attention to governance than part-time
legislators could provide. Foreign policy, economic development, and
well-functioning markets require a good deal of public infrastructure, enforcement, and regulation. To manage foreign relations, the
federal government needed to develop a body of international and
mercantile law, build a national common market, and develop a
statutory and common law of interstate commerce and trade
barriers." To build a transportation system of roads, canals, and
railroads, the new states needed legal mechanisms like corporate
personality, bonds, public credit, and mortgages to facilitate and
protect public and private investment; the government needed to
take and regulate property for public purposes, clothe coerced or
fraudulent expropriations from Indian tribes in the forms of law,
and deal with external effects such as damage to property, persons,
and livestock. 9 The government needed to regulate safety, labor,
slavery, capital markets, and finance; it needed to develop a law of
commercial instruments and insurance; and it needed to cope with
frequent bankruptcy.7"
Lawyers stepped forward to fill the vacuum of public leadership
authority. They had the credentials and the legitimacy, because
they had taken the leading role in state-building in the new
republic. The desire to participate in public life-indeed, to achieve
fame in public life, not just gentlemanly status-became one of the
main reasons for seeking a legal career.7 ' Hamilton aspired to be
like Caesar, the founder of an empire; and he and Madison identified with the great lawgivers of antiquity, Lycurgus and Solon,
Numa and Publius.72 Lawyers had articulated the grievances of
Revolution in legal terms; they had drafted the new federal and
state constitutions and gradually persuaded society to accept them
68. See JAMES WILLARD HURST, LAW AND THE CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM IN THE
NINETEENTH-CENTURY UNITED STATES 13-15 (2d ed. 1964).
69. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 58, at 120-39.

70. For the functions and uses of law and lawyers in the early republic, see id. at 125-39;
HURST, supra note 68, at 29.
71. See DOUGLASS ADAIR, FAME AND THE FOUNDING FATHERS: ESSAYS 7-9 (Trevor
Colbourn ed., 1998) (discussing iconic historical figures that certain Founding Fathers desired
to emulate).
72. See id. at 20-22, 29.

1184

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50:1169

as legal texts subject to lawyers' arguments and judges' interpretations. They took the leading roles in the many conventions to
amend state constitutions. 4 They made legal discourse and legal
procedures into primary modes of governance and dispute settlement in the new nation. 75 Lawyers dominated high offices, state
and federal, elective and appointive, and (after early experiments
with lay judges) monopolized the upper judiciary. 76 By the 1830s,
Tocqueville was calling lawyers the American "aristocracy"-a
ruling class more legitimate than nobles or gentry because they
were an aristocracy of merit.77
Nearly all successful lawyers moved regularly in and out of
politics and public service. In Massachusetts between 1760 and
1840, over half of the entire practicing bar probably sought election
to public office.78 In cities and local communities, lawyers played an
active part in civic life as promoters of civic improvement and
trustees of hospitals, colleges, and charities. 79 The trajectory of a
successful lawyer's career led inexorably to public involvement: the
leaders of the bar were also the leading lawyer-statesmen, propelled
from success in private practice to elective and appointive officemen like Daniel Webster, William Maxwell Evarts, and Elihu Root,
who served both as U.S. Senators and Secretaries of State.8 °
Lawyers have always tended to vastly exaggerate their civicmindedness, which is why historians like Lawrence Friedman have
good reason to be skeptical about their claims."1 In the early
republic, lawyers professed to admire Cicero, the classical republican ideal of the citizen lawyer, who stood for patrician independence
73. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 58, at 71-79.
74. See id.
75. See id.
76. See id. at 79-91.
77. See TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 67, at 276 ("[Mjembers of the legal profession ...
constitute the only aristocratic body which can check the irregularities of the people.").
78. See GERARD GAWALT, THE PROMISE OF POWER: THE EMERGENCE OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION IN MASSACHUSETITS, 1760-1840, at 68 (1979).
79. See MILLER, supra note 53, at 28-29; see also ROBERT F. BODEN, THE COLONIAL BAR
AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 5 (1976) (noting that lawyers "took time off from practice to
perform a public service-that of creating the United States of America).
80. See generally CHESTER L. BARROWS, WILLIAM M. EVARTS: LAWYER, DIPLOMAT,
STATESMAN (1941); MAURICE BAXTER, ONE AND INSEPARABLE: DANIEL WEBSTER AND THE
UNION (1984); 1 PHILIP C. JESSUP, ELHU ROOT (1938).

81. Friedman, supra note 23, at 1155.
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from tyrannical power; Thomas Erskine, the fighter for political
dissidents like Tom Paine; and John Adams, defender of such
unpopular clients as the Boston Massacre soldiers who fired on a
patriot crowd.8 2 Lawyers habitually claimed to act in their public
roles for the general interest as agents of the Constitution and as
a bulwark of the best conservative values, protecting rights of
property from reckless redistribution, but also as champions of
equal rights."3 The emergence of constitutional judicial review, in
particular, gave plausibility to lawyers' claims to be masters of
statecraft and policy, not merely a crabbed and technical legal
science, in their ordinary practices.' Lawyers also claimed to be, as
professionals, a genuinely disinterestedelement in society, upholders of principle against party, class, and faction; upholders of the
rule of law and regular procedure; and selfless public servants.8 5 Bar
leaders and law writers on professional ethics such as George
Sharswood and David Hoffmann routinely denounced the ethic of
"my client first, last and always," insisting that lawyers in their
private practices must remain statesmen, guiding their clients to
seek the public good and doing their part to maintain and improve
the legal framework.' Thus, for example, Simon Greenleaf of the
new Harvard Law School argued:
While our aid should never be withheld from the injured or the
accused, let it be remembered, that all our duties are not
concentrated in conducting an appeal to the law;-that we are
not only lawyers, but citizens and men;-that our clients are not
always the best judges of their own interests,-and that having
confided those interests to our hands, it is for us to advise to that
course, which will best conduce to their permanent benefit, not

82. See ROBERT A. FERGUSON, LAW AND LErrERS IN AMERIcAN CULTURE 74-78 (1984);
PETER CHARLES HOFFER, LAW AND PEOPLE IN COLONIAL AMERICA 112 (1998).
83. See FERGUSON, supra note 82, at 24-28.
84. See id. at 20-24.
85. See Gordon, supra note 52, at 14.

86. See Russell G. Pearce, Rediscoveringthe RepublicanOriginsof the Legal Ethics Codes,
6 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 241, 241, 247 (1992) (citing George Sharswood, An Essay on
ProfessionalEthics, 32 A.BA. REP. 1 (1907)); see also David Hoffman, Resolutions in Regard
to ProfessionalDepartment, in 2 A COURSE OF LEGAL STUDY 752, 758 (1836).
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merely as solitary individuals, but as men connected with
society by enduring ties. 7
Lord Brougham's famous admonition that the "advocate, by the
sacred duty which he owes his client ... [to] save that client by all
expedient means, ... at all hazards and costs to all others ... must not
regard the alarm-the suffering-the torment-the destructionwhich he many bring upon any other,"' was frequently cited, but
almost invariably to condemn it as exaggerated, even monstrous. 89
The quantum of hype in these claims is obvious. Lawyers found
it no easier than anyone else to rise above party, class, and faction;
especially if their livings depended on being such factions' faithful
servants.9 ° Lawyers hardly floated above the politics of party and
faction: they were the cadres of party activists-leaders, wheelhorses, and ideological spokesmen.9 They were as prone as most
political actors to identify their own good, or their clients' good, with
the public good. Unpopular clients without money 92 have never had
much luck attracting lawyers in any age. It is also hard to know how
far lawyers who solemnly abjured their colleagues to refrain from
hardball tactics and to counsel clients in the paths of public virtue
actually carried out that advice in their own practices.
As for lawyers' public service, it was often simply a means of
advancing a private career: political office brought opportunities
to show off oratory and persuasive talents, and to contact and do

87. SIMON GREENLEAF, A DISCOURSE PRONOUNCED AT THE INAUGURATION OF THE AUTHOR
AS ROYALL PROFESSOR OF LAW IN HARVARD UNIVERSITY 17 (1834).
88. Henry Lord Brougham, Speech in the Case of Queen Caroline,in 1 SPEECHES OF HENRY
LORD BROUGHAM 105 (1838). Brougham himself was an exemplary citizen lawyer outside the
bounds of his advocacy practice, one of the most energetic and successful law reformers of his
time, and eventually became Lord Chancellor.
89. The reader can verify this for herself by running a "Brougham w10 advocate" search
through the Making of Modern Law database of legal writings published between 1800 and
1926. Norman Spaulding correctly points out, however, that the rhetoric of public-serving
professionalism was by no means universal. There were plenty of lawyers who spoke up for
a "hired gun" zealous advocate's view of the lawyer's role. Norman Spaulding, The Myth of
Civic Republicanism:Interrogatingthe Ideology of Antebellum Legal Ethics, 71 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1397, 1409 n.45 (2003).
90. See Gordon, supra note 52, at 15.
91. See Konefsky, supra note 56, at 69-70.
92. RHODE, supra note 7, at 58 (referring to such clients as "social pariahs with shallow
pockets").
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favors for potential clients.93 Indeed for many, public life was
simply an extension of private practice. As one of many examples,
Cleveland's Attorney General Richard Olney continued to represent the Chicago Burlington & Quincy Railroad while in office and
used his office to bring injunctions against Eugene Debs's Pullman
union while it was striking his client's railroad.94 In more recent
times, Gale Norton was a lawyer and lobbyist for timber, grazing,
and extractive industries before entering the George W. Bush
Administration; once in office, as Secretary of the Interior, she
effectively continued to be a lawyer and lobbyist for the timber,
grazing, and extractive industries; and when she left office, she took
a job as legal advisor to an oil company.95 Lawyers might sometimes
defend established property rights and regular procedures and the
ideal of access to justice for everyone, but if their clients' interests
lay in destroying such rights, ignoring such procedures, or cutting
off plaintiffs' practical ability to bring tort suits, they would happily
take that side as well. Contrary to the bar's mythology, most of their
work for business clients was not defending them against tyrannical
government, but extracting favors from government-privileges,
subsidies, immunities, tax exemptions, land grants, and contracts. 96
In fact, the public roles of lawyers came under increasing strain
from the pressures of their private practices. English barristers
had adopted rules forbidding them to accept retainers, lest they
become continuously dependent on a single set of clients or clienteles;97 but as early as 1800, the most successful American law
practices were being built on retainers from insurance companies,
banks, merchants, and manufacturers.9" Barristers could not negotiate directly with clients, but they had solicitors to do that for them
and Americans did not.9 9 Nineteenth-century American lawyers
93. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 58, at 233.
94. GERALD G. EGGERT, RICHARD OLNEY: EVOLUTION OF A STATESMAN 151-52 (1974).
95. Zachary Coile, Interior Chief Gale Norton to Step Down, S.F. CHRON., Mar. 11, 2006,
at Al; see Ex-Interior Secretary Norton Is Hired as Counsel for Shell, WALL ST. J., Dec. 28,
2006, at B5.
96. See Gordon, supra note 44, at 94-95; Konefsky, supra note 56, at 76.
97. See ANDY BOON & JENNIFER LEVIN, THE ETHICS AND CONDUCT OF LAWYERS IN

ENGLAND AND WALES 178-83 (1999).
98. See Konefsky, supra note 56, at 89-90.
99. See DANIEL DUMAN, THE ENGLISH AND COLONIAL BARS IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY
41 (1983); FRIEDMAN, supra note 58, at 235.
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spoke frequently and fearfully about the dangers of falling into
dependence on client groups but gradually did so anyway. 0
Yet the view of lawyers as economically self-interested actors
and agents of economically self-interested clients cannot adequately explain the rich traditions of American lawyers' civic
activism-their involvements in state and legal institution building,
first in the founding era and early Republic, then in the construction
of the Progressive administrative state from 1870 to 1940, or their
role in brokering and stabilizing the social contracts of the political
economy in the post-World War II social order.' It cannot explain
their sustained attention to construction and refinement of elaborate systems of private and public law doctrines that were relatively
detached from immediate client interests.' 2 And it certainly cannot
explain lawyers' contributions to the moral and ideological causes
of underdogs and marginals, their campaigns for universal rights
and civic inclusion, from antislavery to civil liberties, civil rights,
and public interest "cause" lawyering.' 0 ' These contributions to
building, maintaining, and reforming the general public framework
of the legal system would seem to require a richer set of explanations.
Perhaps the most favorable conditions for public-minded lawyering have arisen, not surprisingly, when the clienteles themselves
promoted a broad vision of the national interest. The Federalist and
Whig lawyer-statesman of the early Republic were field agents of
the New England mercantile, banking, and industrial elite, with
economic interests in, and a sense of the visionary possibilities of,
a national common market.' 4 Daniel Webster depended on this
clientele for campaign contributions as well as fees; he did much of
the important legal work for them and represented them as
advocate, Senator, and Secretary of State.'0 5 In those capacities he
100. See JAMES C. FOSTER, THE IDEOLOGY OF APoLITIcAL PouIcs: THE ELITE LAWYERS'
RESPONSE TO THE LEGITIMATION CRISIS INAMERICAN CAPITALISM, 1870-1920, at 136-41 (1990);
Konefsky, supra note 56, at 89-91.
101. See Gordon, supra note 46, at 312-14.
102. See id.
103. See id.
104. See R. Kent Newmyer, HarvardLaw School, New England Legal Culture, and the
Antebellum Origins of American Jurisprudence,in THE CONSTITUTION AND AMERICAN LIFE
154, 169 (David Thelen ed., 1988).
105. See BAXTER, supra note 80, at 155-56, 504-06.
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developed, along with other legal visionaries like John Marshall and
Joseph Story, the Federalist-Whig conception of the national Union
under supreme federal law as well as constitutional doctrines of
vested rights that protected some of their clients' enterprises from
legislative revision."'
Moreover, until the late nineteenth century, even lawyers with
extensive and regular ties to business clients felt some freedom to
take on public causes at odds with those of their clients-though
some of them, like the antislavery lawyers, paid a price for it in lost
business.' 7 That is becguse at that time they were still viewed as
independent advocates, able to argue for any side that hired them. 0 8
The advocate's role, diversified clienteles, and the tolerance that law
partnerships had for long leaves to conduct political activity and
public service opened up space for living out the public side of a
lawyer's life. 0 9 The opportunities that public involvement offered
for making a public reputation, making valuable contacts in government and politics, and attracting new clients naturally supplied
additional motives: a lawyer could sometimes accumulate more
social capital as an effective rhetorician or the spokesman for a
public-regarding set of principles than as an industry "hired gun."" 0
To give a couple of examples almost unimaginable today: Rufus
Choate, the leading Boston lawyer of his time and one with many
prominent business clients, represented Gilham Barnes, an injured
worker, in a famous tort suit against the Boston & Worcester
Railroad Co., trying to establish the principle of employer liability
for industrial accidents. Choate argued broadly that the privilege of
incorporation carried with it extensive legal and moral duties of
care."' Clarence Darrow was still general counsel for the Chicago
106. See id. at 172-73 (remarking that Justices Story and Marshall "thought much as
Webster did," and detailing the development of vested rights).
107. See JULES LOBEL, SUCCESS WITHOUT VICTORY: LOST LEGAL BATTLES AND THE LONG
ROAD TO JUSTICE IN AMERICA 50-53 (2003).
108. See Konefsky, supra note 56, at 89-91.
109. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 58, at 233.
110. See JOHN P. HEINZ ET AL., URBAN LAWYERS: THE NEW SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE BAR
205-06 (2005) (discussing a controversial theory put forth by Robert Putnam that civic
engagement is inextricably tied to social capital and that disengagement has depreciated
social capital on a nationwide level).
111. CHRISTOPHER L. TOMLINS, LAW, LABOR AND IDEOLOGY IN THE EARLY AMERICAN
REPUBLIC 331-47 (1993).
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and Northwestern Railway while trying to get pardons for the
Chicago Haymarket defendants;1 12 he resigned from his railroad job
to represent Eugene Debs in his legal battles with the Pullman
Company and the nation's railroads, but continued to do legal work
for his railroad client part-time.1 13 As late as the 1870s, even the
lawyers who appeared most often for railroad clients in court
appeared almost as often for individuals suing the railroads." 4
By the last quarter of the nineteenth century, however, nearly all
of the most successful lawyers were drawn into the orbit of powerful
corporate clients, beginning with the railroads. Some railroad
lawyers tried to retain their independence, but
were overwhelmed by the railroads' insistence on an exclusive
loyalty. If they wanted any railroad work, they had to agree to
represent the railroad exclusively. Often the most able lawyers
in towns along the line were paid retainers, not for actual legal
work, but to prevent them from appearing for anyone on the
other side, not just of the client, but of any anti-railroading
interest. Railroad legal departments organized lawyers as
political as well as legal agents; they formed trade associations,
lobbied and paid for friendly legislation and friendly commissions, and financed campaigns of friendly politicians. By 1900,
a lawyer who had railroads among his clients was expected to
support and be a spokesman for railroad interests generally. 115
At the same time, a specialized personal injury bar, increasingly of
foreign origins, developed to oppose the business bar; just as much
later a labor bar arose to oppose the management bar."6 The
lawyers for business interests and individuals in trouble were
recruited from different social strata and rarely changed sides." 7
As a reaction to this development, a small but ultimately very
influential minority of Progressive Movement lawyers engaged in
112. CLARRENCE DARROW, THE STORY OF MY LIFE 99-100 (1932).
113. Id. at 61-62; ANTHONY LUKAS, BIG TROUBLE 311 (1997).
114. This is based on my own research in progress, a survey of cases in New York and
Illinois between 1860 and 1900.
115. Gordon, supra note 44, at 100. The main source for this passage is WILLIAM THOMAS,
LAWYERING FOR THE RAILROAD: BuSINEss, POWER, AND LAW IN THE NEW SOUTH (1999).
116. See EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., LITIGATION AND INEQUALITY 150-54 (1992).
117. See id. at 150.
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building institutions that, they believed, would enable them both
to practice law and render policy advice in the "public interest,"
relatively free of the direct influence of powerful clienteles, and to
rebuild the public reputation of their profession and rescue the
legal system from corruption. The major institutions of the modern
bar came out of this program. The first major bar association, the
Association of the Bar of the City of New York, was founded by
lawyers who had represented the Erie Railroad and William "Boss"
Tweed's ring before judges and legislatures bribed by their clients,'18
and wanted to redeem their own practices from degradation." 9
The pioneer modern law school, Harvard, was the project of C.C.
Langdell, a former New York practitioner disgusted by his own
practice experience, who retreated to the higher ground of New
England to elevate the profession by infusing it with fresh cadres of
lawyers trained in legal analysis. 20 The first ABA ethics code of
1908 was drafted by lawyers who were as alarmed by the practices
of the business bar as by the practices of the mostly immigrant
new plaintiffs' personal injury bar.' 2 ' The proliferation of administrative commissions and regulatory agencies, and procedures for
reducing patronage in the selection of judges and civil servants,
were all to some extent products of this collective effort. Elihu Root
(later a Secretary of War and Secretary of State) represented the
Metropolitan Street Railway system that controlled most of New
York's surface transit; 22 in 1897, he backed the reform initiative to
put street railway companies under the city's control and make
them conform to fair labor standards. 2 He was a keen and often
ruthless partisan in adversary combat;' 24 but, like almost half of the
2 5
leading lawyers of the city, was also very active in reform causes.'

118. See Gordon, supra note 44, at 76-77.
119. See MICHAEL POWELL, FROM PATRICIAN TO PROFESSIONAL ELITE: THE TRANSFORMATION

OF THE NEW YORK CITY BAR ASSOCIATION 6-7 (1988).
120. See WILLIAM LAPIANA, LOGIC AND EXPERIENCE: THE ORIGIN OF MODERN AMERICAN
LEGAL EDUCATION 13 (1994).

121. See Susan Carle, Lawyer's Duty To Do Justice:A New Look at the History of the 1908
Canons, 24 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 1, 7-8 (1999).

122.
123.
124.
125.

JESSUP, supra note 80, at 183-84.
See id. at 193.
See, e.g., id. at 177-78.
See, e.g., id. at 193-94.
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Like the Whig lawyers of the previous century, leading lawyers
of the Progressive period, such as Louis Brandeis, Elihu Root,
Charles Evans Hughes, Henry Stimson, and Harlan Fiske Stone
had the backing of relatively forward-looking business clients, who
perceived they had something to gain from state-building and a
politics of reform and social compromise: corruption reform and a
meritocratic civil service; public utilities rate regulation that would
stave off public ownership; worker's compensation that would
stabilize costs of industrial accidents; federal child labor regulation
that would level the playing field with Southern competitors; and
concords with labor unions that would advance the cause of industrial peace.' 2 6 Likewise, the lawyers (and bankers) who directed U.S.
foreign policy for most of the twentieth century represented, in both
their private and public roles, an Eastern internationalist sector of
investment bankers and multinational businesses with extensive
foreign investments and a vested interest in international stability
(peace and prosperity in Europe, friendly and pliable regimes in the
developing world), and international legal and dispute settlement
institutions.'2 7 Such clients were often party to quasi-corporatist
arrangements (for example, the wartime industry boards, the
interwar trade associations, the National Recovery Administration
code associations, and the postwar defense industry) run through
public-private agencies that they staffed with their lawyers. 2 ' The
New Deal further expanded opportunities for lawyers to serve as
mediators between business-client interests and the administrative
state and to move between public and private careers.' 2 9 It also
created thousands of new functions for government and labor
lawyers.130
In the post-World War II era, a group of lawyers and legal
academics-including Lon Fuller, Willard Hurst, Harvard "Legal
Process" scholars Henry Hart and Albert Sacks, and corporate
126. See Gordon, supra note 44, at 95-96.
127. See id. at 96.
128. See, e.g., Daniel R. Ernst, Law and the State, 1920-2000: InstitutionalGrowth and
Structural Change, in 3 CAMBRIDGE HIsToRY OF LAW IN AMERICA 1, 9-10 (Michael Grossberg
& Christopher Tomlins eds., 2008) (describing the purpose and operative characteristics of the
National Recovery Administration).
129. Gordon, supra note 44, at 106.
130. For a fuller account of these developments, see generally id. at 73-126.
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lawyer Beryl Harold Levy-theorized, from hints dropped by such
Progressive lawyers as Brandeis and Adolf Berle, the role of the new
corporate legal counselor as a "statesman-adviser."1 3' 1 The counselor
represents his client's interest "with an eye to securing not only
the client's immediate benefit but his long range social benefit."'32
In negotiating and drafting contracts, collective bargaining agreements, and reorganization plans, the lawyer is a lawmaker of
"private legislation" and "private constitutions";' 33 a "prophylactic
avoider of troubles, as well as pilot through anticipated difficulties."'3 4 Lawyers who helped businesses fix prices, cheat on taxes,
violate safety regulations or labor laws, or produce dangerous
products were not really helping their clients-which the theorists
conceived of as entities that had a long-term interest in their
reputations as good citizens and continuing relations with governments, customers, and local communities. The lawyer's job was not
only to represent the client to the legal system, but also to represent
the legal system to the client; to not only help the client navigate
through the maze of law and minimize the adverse effects of law,
but also to stay on the right side of the law.' 35 Thus, they thought,
private and public roles of lawyering could be merged. 3 '
The vision rested on particular material and institutional
conditions. The most important was having the right kind of client.
Berle named the executives Gerard Swope and Owen D. Young
of General Electric as the prototype of "manageralist" business
leaders'3 7 who eventually came to dominate wartime government
agencies and advisory boards, made their peace with the New Deal,
accepted unions as the price of stability, and whose lawyers moved
in and out of government and codrafted regulations in business131. William H. Simon was the first to identify this conception of professional obligation
and its sources, which he christened "Purposivism." See Simon, supra note 11, at 62; see also
BERYLHAROLD LEVY, CORPORATION LAWYER: SAINTOR SINNER? 149 (1961) (establishing a role
of the lawyer as a "statesman-adviso').
132. LEVY, supra note 131, at 150.
133. Id. at 151.
134. Id. at 153.
135. See Simon, supra note 11, at 68.
136. See id. at 71.
137. A.A. Berle, Jr., For Whom CorporateManagersAre Trustees:A Note, 45 HARv. L. REV.
1365, 1372 (1932). For Swope and Young's role at General Electric, see E. Merrick Dodd, Jr.,
For Whom Are CorporateManagers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145, 1154-55 (1932).
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friendly regulatory agencies.' 3 8 The vision also assumed the model
of stable corporate law firm relations that prevailed until the 1970s:
a single firm composed of partners for life, who did virtually all of
the legal work for corporate clients who retained them indefinitely,
rarely questioned their bills, and gave their utmost trust and
confidence." 9 '"The"wise counselor" vision of the lawyer's role found
its way into the Joint Report prefacing the ABA's 1969 Model Code
of Professional Responsibility;"'4 ° and, according to Erwin Smigel's
1964 study of Wall Street law firms, it had been completely
internalized by the partners of those firms. 141 By employing such
stratagems, business lawyers rescued a conception of a meaningful
1 42
public role for their profession from descent into servility.
By the 1980s, however, the ideology of the lawyer as "wise counselor," which neatly spanned the public-private divide by picturing
the enlightened long-run interest of the client as ultimately harmonious with the public interest as constructed by public-private
corporatist partnerships, had all but disappeared. Robert Nelson's
1988 study of Chicago corporate lawyers"' and John Heinz and
colleagues' 1993 study of Washington lawyers14 found almost no
trace of it: both samples of lawyers saw themselves as technically
138. See, e.g., KIM MCQUAID, UNEASY PARTNERS: BIG BUSINESS IN AMERICAN POLITICS,
1945-1990, at 19-23 (1994) (discussing the role of the Business Council and the Council for
Economic Development in establishing a fluid partnership between the public and private
sectors after the New Deal).
139. See Gordon, supra note 44, at 106.
140. See Gordon, supra note 24, at 1209; see also Am. Bar Assoc. & Assoc. of Am. Law
Schools, ProfessionalResponsibility: Report of the Joint Conference, 44 A.B.A. J. 1159, 1162
(1958) ('Thus partisan advocacy is a form of public service so long as it aids the process of
adjudication; it ceases to be when it hinders that process, when it misleads, distorts and
obfuscates, when it renders the task of the deciding tribunal not easier, but more difficult.").
So too with lawyer as negotiator and draftsman: "[H]e works against the public interest when
he obstructs the channels of collaborative effort, when he seeks petty advantages to the
detriment of the larger processes in which he participates." Id.
141. ERWIN 0. SMIGEL, THE WALL STREET LAWYER 262-72 (1969).
142. In a review of Levy's book, Adolf Berle hoped that this conception of business
lawyering might "in time redeem the bulk of the corporation bar from the profitable but
usually undistinguished bondage in which most of it lives." Adolf A. Berle, Book Review, 76
HARV. L. REV. 430,433 (1962) (reviewing BERYL HAROLD LEVY, CORPORATION LAWYER... SAINT
OR SINNER? THE NEW ROLE OF THE LAWYER INMODERN SOCIETY (1961)).
143. See ROBERT NELSON, PARTNERS WITH POWER: THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE
LARGE LAW FIRM 247-59 (1988).
144. JOHN P. HEINZ ET AL., THE HOLLOW CORE: PRIVATE INTERESTS IN NATIONAL
POLICYMAKING 186-89 (1993).
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implementing goals predetermined by their clients and rarely
questioned them, much less engaged in a dialogue about the longrun social and political effects of those goals.145 The recent "professionalism" projects of the ABA and state bar associations mainly
define professionalism as the restoration of "civility" and improving
access to justice.14 6 The citizen lawyer ideal, that lawyers might
have special obligations as curators of legal norms to urge clients
to comply with those norms, has largely disappeared from the
practicing bar's standard accounts of its functions and obligations.
So what happened? I have space here only to list what seem to me
to be the main factors responsible for the decline of the public
citizen lawyer ideal in the ideology of the elite bar and the rise and
revalorization of the privatized conception of the lawyer's role. I
have split this list of factors into political-economic changes, intraprofessional changes, and general cultural changes.
Political-economic:
1. The quasi-corporatist social contract underlying the assumption of ultimate harmony between big business firms' interests
and the public's began to collapse in the late 1960s and early
1970s. Business firms embarked on newly adversary relations
with governments by resisting much of the new social regulation (environmental, occupational health, and safety), getting
rid of their unions and forestalling the organization of new
ones when they could, and aggressively minimizing their tax
liabilities. 4 7
2. As costs of litigation and regulatory compliance (and
resistance) rose, companies cut back on legal costs by bringing
much work in-house, upgrading general counsel to contract out
and supervise legal services, breaking stable relations with
145. See id. at 185-86.
146. See, e.g., Commission on Professionalism of the Illinois Supreme Court, Overview,
http://ilsccp.org/ (last visited Feb. 11, 2009) ("Our mission is to promote a professional culture
in which lawyers embody the ideals of our profession in service not only to their clients, but
to the administration of justice and to the public good."). Information regarding the projects
of other state bar professional commissions can be accessed at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/
professionalism/profcommissions.html (last visited Feb. 11, 2009).
147. For a summary of these trends in business-government relations, see MCQUAID, supra
note 138, at 135-38, 141-42.
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outside lawyers, and auctioning off fragments of legal business
(merger or takeover bid, a big transaction, or major litigation,
to name a few) to competing outside firms.14 8 In-house management and general counsel, rather than law firm partners, now
determined the business's legal strategy: from lawyers they
wanted only prompt, efficient, cost-conscious execution and
total loyalty. 'Wise counsel" was requested only of inside
general counsel if of anyone; in any case outside firms knew too
had longlittle about the business to provide it and no longer
149
term relations of trust with managers anyway.
Intraprofessional:
3. In response to this new environment, law firms' priorities
changed. To compete for client business, firms competed for
partners who could attract client business. Rainmakers, rather
than lawyers conspicuous for their public service, became the
leaders of the firms and reoriented their priorities to profit
seeking."15 To compete for new associates to staff the rapidlygrowing partnership ranks, firms raised salaries;' 5 ' to pay for
the new salaries, they demanded virtually all their lawyers'
time."' As firms compete with one another and with other
professions, such as accounting firms, the last thing firm
lawyers want to stress is that their ethical orientation to public
ends may conflict with that of their clients'.
4. Lawyers' work, continuing trends from the 1880s, became
much more specialized. The leaders of the bar in 1900 were still
mostly generalists-men who made their mark as trial lawyers
who tried a medley of civil and criminal cases, "wills, divorces,
libels, murders," as constitutional lawyers who argued before
the Supreme Court and as general business advisers. ' "The
growth of the regulatory state with its arcana of complex
148. See Gordon, supra note 44, at 115-16.
149. For a summary of these trends, see JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., GATEKEEPERS; THE
PROFESSIONS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 223-26 (2006).

150. See MARC GALANTER & THOMAS PALAY, TOURNAMENT OF LAWYERS 30-31 (1991) ("[In
many cases there was some consideration of the candidate's [for partnership] ability to attract
business.").
151. Id. at 56.
152. Gordon, supra note 44, at 116.
153. Id. at 117.
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technical administrative rules doomed the generalist" in
business practice; "a lawyer could spend a lifetime mastering
a few sections of the corporate tax code ... and keeping up with
new amendments and regulations."" 4 Fields such as prosecution, labor, tax, patents, and securities were highly specialized
by the mid-twentieth century. 5 ' "In the late 1970s, 22 percent
of Chicago lawyers worked in only one field, [and] 70 percent
considered themselves specialists; by the late 1980s, 32 percent
said they worked in only one field."'5 6 Specialized lawyers are
more likely to be technicians than lawyer-statesmen, less likely
to develop and act on general conceptions of legal structure,
design, and purpose.
5. The public minded lawyer and wise counselor is also partly
a casualty of the course of professional ethics reforms. It was
easy for lawyers to prescribe ample public and other aspirational duties for one another when there was no sanction
for violating them. This was true throughout the nineteenth
century, when there was no organized profession, and much of
the twentieth, when the elite used the disciplinary machinery
to sanction the solo practitioner and plaintiffs' bars that
opposed them, rather than its own ranks. 5 7 The aspirational
tradition continued through the 1969 ABA Model Code in the
distinction between "Ethical Considerations" that should guide
the lawyer's conduct and 'Disciplinary Rules," the violation of
In the 1970s, the profession
which would be sanctioned.'
began to be regulated by courts, professional bar discipline
agencies, regulatory agencies, and malpractice suits. 59 Fear of
liability has led lawyers to shy away from any statements of
duties other than clear penal rules: this is the pattern of the

154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Gordon, supra note 46, at 294.
157. Id. at 297.
158. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY preliminary statement (1969) ("The Ethical
The Disciplinary Rules, unlike the Ethical
Considerations are aspirational in character ....
Considerations, are mandatory in character.").
159. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Future of Legal Ethics, 100 YALE L.J. 1239, 1255-57
(1991) (discussing the evolution of ethics codes from standards to rules).
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ABA Model Rules of 1983.160 If liability is in prospect, lawyers
do not want to perform complex discretionary balancing of
public and private duties; they want clear rules to follow. 6 '
Into the resulting vacuum of silence about lawyers' aspirational
ideals has rushed the only consistent ideal left: the ethic of
unswerving zeal and loyalty to clients.
6. Corporate lawyers, in contrast to past times, seem to feel
very little identification with, or sense of proprietorship over,
the law, except perhaps a general commitment to the processes
and values of the adversary system (with the exception of jury
trials). Lawyers of the nineteenth century saw the common law
and the Constitution as their achievement and their inheritance, their responsibility to conserve and improve. 2 Even
during the New Deal, conservative lawyers identified with the
general norms of liberty and property in the Constitution as
bulwarks against overregulation;'6 3 whereas liberal lawyers
identified with the statutory and administrative innovations
that they had helped design.'64 Because most law is now the
output of the regulatory state and has come to include expanded remedies against government and business,'65 corporate lawyers have come to see law as something of an alien
excrescence (except, of course, when it favors their side).
Indeed, one of the most remarkable developments of recent
times has been the explosion of expressions of contempt for the
legal system emanating from the highest precincts of the elite
legal profession.' 6 6 This hostility to law, lawyers, and legal
process is mostly directed against the civil justice system,
which is said to be awash in meritless claims brought by

160. See id. at 1251.
161. See id. at 1249-55.
162. See Gordon, supra note 46, at 123.
163. See id. at 105; J.L. Hill, The Five Faces of Freedom in American Political and
ConstitutionalThought, 45 B.C. L. REV. 499, 536-37 (2004).
164. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 58, at 546.
165. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (2000) (allowing plaintiffs to recover punitive damages for
employment discrimination claims).
166. See, e.g., Robert H. Bork, Foreword to MAX BOOT, OUT OF ORDER: ARROGANCE,
CORRUPTION, AND INCOMPETENCE ON THE BENCH xi (1998) (describing the legal system as in
"shambles").
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whining plaintiffs egged on by greedy lawyers, resulting in out
of control damage awards that are destroying the competitiveness of American business.16 Careful studies demonstrate that
the "litigation explosion" and "liability crisis" are largely myths
and that most lawyers' efforts go into representing businesses,
not individuals; unfortunately, those studies have had no
restraining effect on this epidemic of lawyers' open expression
of disdain for law.'6 8 It may be, however, that business lawyers'
identification with law and the courts may rise again with the
recent revival of business-friendly jurisprudence in the
Supreme Court.'6 9
7. As I mentioned earlier, the citizen lawyer ideal has now
become the domain of new cadres of lawyers specializing in the
public interest. 7 0 Writing in 1933, Adolf Berle pronounced that
law professors were the heir to the American bar's publicregarding lawyer-statesmen traditions, obviously referring to
the band of Progressive and New Deal policy reformers in the
law schools. 7 ' He should also have mentioned the small but
significant group of "cause" lawyers, including the ACLU and
NAACP lawyers-and some in the rising labor bar.'72 "Cause"
lawyers were rarely drawn from the elite of the bar; they were
mostly lawyers relegated to the margins of their profession
because they were Jewish, Catholic, black, or female.' After
the New Deal, Berle would have to have added the new legions
of government lawyers; and, by the 1970s, a new generation of
full-time "public-interest" lawyers-both liberal and (now more

167. Marc Galanter, An Oil Strike in Hell: Contemporary Legends About the Civil Justice
System, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 717, 717 (1998).
168. On the rising prevalence and sources of "jaundiced" views of the civil justice system,
see id. at 740-50.
169. See, e.g., BMW v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574-75 (1996) (holding that the Constitution
places limits on punitive damages).
170. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
171. A.A. Berle, Jr., Modern Legal Profession, in 5 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES
340-45 (Edwin R.A. Seligman & Alvin S. Johnson eds., 1933).
172. Gordon, supra note 44, at 102.
173. See Aaron Porter, Norris, Schmidt, Green, Harris,Higginbothom & Associates: The
Sociolegal Import of PhiladelphiaCause Lawyers, in CAUSE LAWYERING, supranote 49, at 151,
156; see also GALANTER & PALAY, supra note 150, at 25.
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often than not) conservative, and radical.'7 4 Among the bar elite
and the organized bar, commitment to public causes has taken
the form of commitment to "legalist" projects-promotion of due
process, civil liberties, and, since the 1970s, pro bono practice
and government and bar-supported legal services. 1 75 Since the
1980s, new cadres of conservative public interest lawyers'
groups have been formed to serve ideological agendas that are
sometimes distinct from those of business groups and sometimes even at odds with them. 176 Conservative movement
lawyers move easily between associations like the Federalist
Society, corporate law firms, think tanks like the Heritage and
Cato Foundations, and federal executive branch agencies in
Republican administrations. 177 Professional specialization in
causes has generally taken the place of the older idea that all
lawyers should represent the public purposes of the law in
17 8
their advice to clients as well as in their part-time activities.
General cultural changes
8. Under criticism from both sides of the political aisle,
traditional conceptions of the professions have declined amid
a new valorization of market culture. The 1960s and 1970s
were hard times for social and cultural authority generally and
the traditional professions specifically. 79 "Left-wing critics
attacked them as elitist conspiracies to exclude, dominate,
exploit and paternalistically control social inferiors by mystifying professional knowledge. Right-wing critics and economists
attacked them as cartels designed to restrict entry and fix

174. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Causes of Cause Lawyering, in CAUSE LAWYERING,
supra note 49, at 31, 43.
175. See, e.g., Stuart Scheingold, The Struggle to Politicize Legal Practice, in CAUSE
LAWYERING, supra note 49, at 118, 125.
176. See STEVEN TELES, THE RISE OF THE CONSERVATIVE LEGAL MOVEMENT 263-64 (2008).

177. Id. at 146-47, 158-59.
178. See generally CAUSE LAWYERING, supra note 49 (discussing the rise of public-interest
and "cause" lawyers); ANN SOUTHWORTH, LAWYERS OF THE RIGHT: PROFESSIONALIZING THE
CONSERVATIVE COALITION (2008) (discussing conservative public interest lawyers); TELES,
supra note 176.
179. STEVEN BRINT, IN AN AGE OF EXPERTS: THE CHANGING ROLE OF PROFESSIONALS IN
POLITICS AND PUBIC LIFE 112-14 (1994).
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prices.' " As applied to lawyers, both of these critiques had of
course some validity.
Valid or not, the critiques had a corrosive effect on attempts to
defend professional values, good as well as bad, in terms of civic
virtue or social trusteeship. The left-wing solution was lay
empowerment of consumers, entry of lay providers, and redistri-

bution of social and economic power. The right-wing solution,
which generally prevailed, was deregulation, increasing competition, and faith in market forces.181
9. In corporate practice, the marketeers found a point of entry
to law practice in the crisis over the old models of law firm
management. Law was a business and should be managed like
a business.18 2 This could have meant, of course, simply more
cost efficient management, in the service of whatever collection
of diverse goals-for example, public service, civic activism, or
reputation for probity, craftsmanship, and honorable dealing-that the firm chose to pursue. As carried out, however, it
meant adoption of a firm's profits, specifically its net-profits per
partner, as the primary, if not exclusive indicator of its
83

success.

10. In a parallel development, the growth of economism as an
academic mode of thinking about law devalues any conception
of law as expressing norms or public purposes. Lawyers
influenced by the "efficient breach" theories of legal economics
theorize Holmes's hypothetical "bad man"'8 4 as Everyman:
"[Corporate] managers have no general obligation to avoid
violating regulatory laws, when violations are profitable to the
firm.... We put to one side laws concerning violence or other
acts thought to be malum in se."185 Further,
180. See Gordon, supra note 44, at 122; BRINT, supra note 179, at 114.
181. See Gordon, supra note 44, at 122; BRINT, supra note 179, at 111.
182. GALANTER & PALAY, supra note 150, at 52 (remarking that to increase competitiveness, firms have hired professional managers and engage in marketing strategies and
compensation formulas with an emphasis on the bottom line).
183. See id. at 52, 100.
184. See Holmes, supra note 34, at 459.
185. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Antitrust Suits by Targets of Tender Offers,
80 MICH. L. REV. 1155, 1168 n.36 (1982) (citations omitted).
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[M]anagers do not have an ethical duty to obey economic
regulatory laws just because the laws exist. They must determine the importance of these laws. The penalties Congress
names for disobedience are a measure of how much it wants
firms to sacrifice in order to adhere to the rules; the idea of
optimal sanctionsis based on the suppositionthat managersnot
only may but also should violate the rules when it is profitableto
do so."S
These remarks come from a distinguished federal judge and
former law school dean. This ideology takes a more common
and vulgar shape-which fastidious law and economics
scholars would presumably not accept-as simply global
Babbitry: whatever businesses want is good, and whatever
constrains them--especially if it emanates from governments-is bad.
11. Finally, this general contempt for law is reinforced by a
different but related set of trends-the revival in new forms of
what has always been an important strain in American culture,
a sort of libertarian antinomianism. In its original evangelical
form, this was an ideal of individual internal self-governance,
based on the premise that each of us has natural capacity to
know, and to choose to follow, the moral law; and that at best
man-made law is an artificial constraint, at worst a form of
idolatry.8 7 This is not the form that antilegalism mostly takes
today. It is rather the belief that "autonomy"-however
exercised, toward whatever ends, with whatever effects on
others or the social fabric, and in the satisfaction of whatever
tastes, desires, or preferences the fancy pleases-is a value in
and of itself. 8 It is this refiguration of the idea of autonomous
freedom-very distant from nineteenth century classical
liberalism's view of the individual's freedom to act responsibly
186. Id. at 1177 n.57 (emphasis added). For an exceptionally penetrating critique of the
view of law these quotes express, see Cynthia A. Williams, CorporateCompliance with the
Law in the Era of Efficiency, 76 N.C. L. REV. 1265, 1266-67 (1998).
187. See WILLIAM K.B. STOEVER, 'A FAIRE AND EASIE WAY TO HEAVEN': COVENANT
THEOLOGY AND ANTINOMIANISM IN EARLY MASSACHUSETTS 161-62 (1978).
188. See David Luban, The LysistrationPrerogative, 1986 AM. B. FoUND. REs. J. 637, 638-
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within a sphere of right constrained by the rights of others, by
social restraints and obligations, and ultimately by law"'that, I think, makes possible our modern conceptions of the role
of the lawyer as someone who does his best to help clients get
what they want in the world, regardless of the consequences,
and to work around or flatten the constraints that the legal
system sets on that kind of freedom.19
These have been notes toward a history of a regulative ideal, that
of law as a public profession, staffed by citizen lawyers who counsel
their clients to serve the purposes of the law, and who work after
hours and on leave from practice to reform the law and distribute
justice more widely. Tensions between the ideal and the actual in
the past have recruited a small but influential minority to the cause
of remedying the practice to approximate the ideal. In recent
times-outside the specialized precincts of public interest law-the
tension has mostly been resolved by simply dumping the ideal or
relocating it to settings in which economic pressures are less likely
to compromise it.' 9 ' Like the railroads of the late nineteenth
century, clients now demand an exclusive loyalty to their interests,
and virtually all of their lawyers' time.'9 2 Most importantly, major
business clients are less public-minded: the search for stability has
given way to competition; accommodation with regulators and labor
has given way to confrontation; and service to local communities
has given way to global mobility.'93 In response, business lawyers
have mostly dropped the rhetoric of professional public-serving
ideals, and have recharacterized their work as that of business
service providers who sell specialized legal-financial services to
customers. 194

189. See Hill, supra note 163, at 527-28, 538-42.
190. For a critique of "autonomy" as a freestanding value, see Luban, supra note 188, at
638-43.
191. See, e.g., Scheingold, supra note 175, at 125-26.
192. See GALANTER & PALAY, supra note 150, at 95.
193. I hasten to say do not regard all of these trends as negative. The older ideals tended
to flourish in a protectionist world of cartels and cozy deals that often stifled competition from
new entrants, innovators, foreign firms, and people of the "wrong" race, ethnicity, or sex.
194. See GALANTER & PALAY, supra note 150, at 5-6 (discussing, in part, a "shift from
courtroom advocate to business adviser" that has occurred in the past generation).
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My theme is not a lament for the good old days, or a story of the
bar's descent from virtue. It is likely that the general ethical level
of the American bar today, owing in part to more effective disciplinary and regulatory controls, is higher than it ever was; and that a
larger proportion of lawyers is engaged in (broadly defined) publicoriented practices. In some ways, bar organizations are probably
doing a better job at facilitating public service than they ever
have-supporting legal services, access to justice, pro bono commitments by law firms, the rights of criminal defendants, and the
protection of civil liberties and due process against the excesses of
the national security state.'9 5 Where the profession's leadership is
not doing so well is in supporting the obligations and the practical
capacities of lawyers to take positions and work for policies that
their experience leads them to believe may be in the public interest
but not (at least not immediately) in the interest of their clients.
Those functions require founding, funding, and participating in
collective organizations that can and will push for legal changes
that transcend the short-term profit interests of lawyers and of
powerful client groups.
Some of these efforts already exist. The bar associations, as
noted above, have become very active in promoting more and more
efficiently delivered legal services to low and moderate income
people, and pro bono work." The National Association of Criminal
Defense Lawyers lobbies for decriminalization of drugs despite the
fact that winning on that issue would cost its members a substantial
portion of clients and fees.' 97 The American Academy of Matrimonial
Lawyers publishes guidelines and conducts seminars trying to
promote cooperative settlement of disputes between divorcing
couples, despite the fact that they profit from contention. 198 Some
national prosecutors' associations are trying to clamp down on
overzealous abuses of prosecutorial discretion despite the fact that
195. See Robert Granfield, InstitutionalizingPublic Service in Law School, 54 BUFF. L. REV.
1355, 1355-56 (2007).
196. See id.
197. See Gerald Lippert, Affiliate News, CHAMPION, Mar. 2005, at 7 (documenting funding
that NACDL has received to continue its legalization campaign through outreach and
legislative tracking).
198. See, e.g., Am. Acad. of Matrimonial Lawyers, Bounds of Advocacy (Nov. 2000),
http://www.aaml.org/files/publicdBounds_of_Advocacy.htm Gast visited Feb. 11, 2009).
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to stay silent would make their jobs easier.' Maybe the most
interesting examples are tax lawyers' groups like the New York
State Bar's, which recommend and lobby for policies that would
close down ethically and economically indefensible (but often legal)
tax evasion schemes despite the fact that such schemes are
extremely profitable both to their clients and themselves.2 0" And
there are many more such groups.
But current efforts, while commendable, are not nearly enough.
In the big political fights about tort reform, for example, most
lawyers' groups-for instance, the plaintiffs' trial bar, the insurance
and corporate defense bar-are, so far as I can tell, so blatantly and
narrowly self-interested, and so unconcerned with correcting
systemic abuses and defects in the tort claims system, that they
have lost any sense of credibility with serious reformers. Even in the
wake of several major scandals, such as the savings-and-loan crisis
and the Enron collapse, in which lawyers, along with other gatekeepers, were found to have actively enabled frauds that resulted in
huge losses, the corporate bar largely resisted reforms that would
have increased their responsibilities to monitor corporate managers'
conduct, although that conduct had inflicted ruinous injuries on the
very corporate entities that formed their clientele.20 '
In the early twentieth century, Progressive lawyers deployed
their stature and influence with clients to try to persuade them that
reforms like worker's compensation, abolition of child labor, and
food, drug, and meat regulation were in their best interests.2 °2
Which prominent lawyers and law firms today are active in advising
their major clients that enactment of universal health insurance
would help bring their benefits costs under control and help cure
some major distortions in the labor market? Or in drafting and
lobbying for regulatory reforms that would prevent another
199. Ronald F. Wright, Sentencing Commissions as Provocateurs of ProsecutorialSelfRegulation, 105 COLUM. L. REv. 1010, 1023 (2005).
200. See Tanina Rostain, Sheltering Lawyers: The Organized Tax Bar and the Tax Shelter
Industry, 23 YALE J. ON REG. 77, 94-95 (2006) (noting that although individual tax lawyers
profited from the status quo, collectively the tax bar argued that the status quo threatened
the integrity of the tax system).
201. See Nicole Kroetsch & Samantha Petrich, Task Force on CorporateResponsibility,
CurrentDevelopments 2002-2003, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHIcS 727, 729-30 (2003).
202. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
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meltdown of credit, mortgage, and financial markets? If they exist
at all, one certainly does not hear much about them. The citizen
lawyer may one day stage a comeback, and I hope she does; but
present conditions are not favorable.

